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WORKMUEWS COMPENSATION
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS-THE RESTATEMENT AND OTHER RE-
CENT DEVELOPMENTS
By RALPH H. DWAN*S EVERAL years ago the writer published in this REVIEW an
article1 in which an attempt was made to organize and classify
the English and American cases dealigg with conflict of laws ques-
tions arising out of 2 the application of Workmen's Compensation
Acts.3 Enough water has passed under the bridge since then to
warrant a supplementary article on American developments. No-
table events have been the very recent publication of the Restatement
of the Law of Conflict of Laws4 and Professor Beale's treatise based
on the Restatement,5 the entry of the United States Supreme Court
into the field,' and the tendency of legislatures to cover specific
problems by amendments to the Acts.7  In the discussion the or-
ganization of the Restatement will be used, followed by a treat-
ment of a few matters not covered by the Restatement.
In the Restatement the topic of Workmen's Compensation
begins with an introductory note. The first paragraph states the
general characteristics of the Acts. The second paragraph states
three theories on which the Acts have been fitted into the fabric of
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.1Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws, (1927) 11
MilNxsoTA LAW REvmw 329; reprinted in (1927) 61 Am. L Rev. 571;
also reprinted with some alterations in (1928) 26 Monthly Labor Review
528 (U.S. Department of Labor; Bureau of Labor Statistics). Frequent
references will be made to this article for the earlier authorities. Only the
volume and page of the MINNFsOT. LAw REviEw will be cited.
2One is tempted to add: "and in the course of."
3Hereafter, except in quotations, the term Act will be used to mean
Workmen's Compensation Act unless otherwise qualified.
4American Law Institute, 1934.5Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935). The discussion of
Workmen's Compensation is in Volume 2, sections 398.1-403.1 inc., pp. 1317-
1328.
6See infra, pp. 34-41.
YThis is indicated in cases cited hereafter. The statutes themselves will
not be cited. No attempt has been made to follow up any statutory changes
which may have been made since the last reported decision in a particularjurisdiction. Recent reviews of statutory materials may be found in:
Bulletin No. 496, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Workmen's
Compensation Legislation of the United States and Canada as of January
1, 1929 and later supplementary bulletins; Roos, The Problem of Workmen's
Compensation in Air Transportation, (1935) 6 Journal of Air Law 1,
13-38, 48-69; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation, 2nd ed., p. 428-433.
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the law. Those theories will be discussed later in connection with
the problem of when the local Act applies. The third paragraph
considers matters which will be discussed under the following
heading.
I. ENFORCEMENT IN ONE JURISDICTION OF RIGHTS OR
AWARDS UNDER ACT OF ANOTHER JURISDICTION.
The introductory note says that an Act usually calls for the
award of compensation by a particular administrative tribunal and
that the difficulties of procedure inay make it impracticable for a
court in another state to attempt to administer the Act; hence no
award is ordinarily made under the provisions of the Act of a
foreign state." The words italicized above indicate that there may
be exceptions to these statements. It is at least conceivable that
a claim for compensation which can be asserted only before an ad-
ministrative tribunal might be enforced by a similar administrative
tribunal in another jurisdiction.' At any rate, there is considerable
authority for direct enforcement in another jurisdiction of a com-
pensation claim where the applicable Actprovides for the fixing of
compensation by court action, at least where the provisions of the
Act can be carried out without too much difficulty.10
For authorities, see 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 329, 331-332; see also
Resigno v. F. Jarka Co., (1927) 221 App. Div. 214, 220, 223 N. Y. S. 5;
Bolin v. Swift & Co., (Mo. 1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 774.9See 11 MINNESOtA LAW REVIEw 329, 331-332. See dicta in Scott v.
White Eagle Oil and Refining Co., (D.C. Kan. 1930) 47 F. (2d) 615. See
express provision in the Arizona Act requiring, under certain circum-
stances, enforcement in Arizona of rights acquired under the Act of another
state, if the rights "are such that they can reasonably be determined and
dealt with by the commission and the courts of this state," The applica-
bility of this provision is discussed in Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Industrial
Com., (1927) 32 Ariz. 275, 283-286, 257 Pac. 644. See similar express
provision in Idaho Code Annotated 1932, Sec. 43-1415, cited in Dameron v.
Yellowstone Trail Garage, (1934) 54 Idaho 646, 34 P. (2d) 417.1 0Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d)
171, cert. denied (1927) 273 U. S. 742, 47 Sup. Ct. 335, 71 L. Ed. 869;
Lindberg v. Southern Casualty Co., (D.C. Tex. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 54,
affirmed United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1927) 18 F.
(2d) 453. See 11 MINNESoTA LAW REvIEw 329, 331.
It is an a fortiori case where the Act provides for an ordinary suit at
law as a supplemental remedy. Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 364 (enforcement in Texas federal court o f right
under Act of Puerto Rico).
The Lindberg case is criticized on the ground that "it is in the nature
of a compensation act that there shall be no claim for an unfixed amount
but only for the amount fixed by the tribunal in which the case is to be
taken up." 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, sec. 398.1, p. 1317.
In Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d)
800, recovery under the Louisiana Act in the federal district court for
Mississippi was denied on the ground that the time limitation fixed by the
Louisiana Act had expired. The court did not consider it necessary to
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The introductory note also states that if an award has been
made in a state under its local Act, a suit may be brought in an-
other state on the award. The closest case found is a New York
decision" requiring the acceptance by the New York liquidator of an
insurance company of a claim based upon a compensation award of
the Texas Industrial Accident Board. The validity of the original
claim could not be reopened; full faith and credit, said the cburt,
must be given to the determination of the Texas tribunal, under the
federal ,constitution. In an analogous case 12 the United States
Supreme Court held that a final judgment of an Iowa court of
record holding that the deceased workman was engaged in intra-
state commerce (and affirming an award under the Iowa Act)
was res adjudicata on that issue and entitled to full faith and credit
in an action in Minnesota under the Federal Employers Liability
Law. In a companion case 22 the Supreme Court denied the same
effect to a similar decision by the Iowa deputy industrial com-
missioner on the ground that his decision had not ripened into an
enforceable award in Iowa, the effect of which the Court con-
sidered itself not called upon to determine. However, lower fed-
eral cases' 3 contain dicta that such a decision of an administrative
workmen's compensation board comes within the res judicata prin-
ciple.
II. WHEN DOES THE LOCAL AcT APPLY?
This problem is dealt with by three sections of the Restate-
ment.
"Sec. 398. Compensation Under Act of State of Employment.
A workman who enters into a contract of employment in a
decide whether the Louisiana Act applied under the circumstances. This case
was followed, on the statute of limitations point, in Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. Dixon, (1933) 168 Miss. 14, 150 So. 811; Dunn Const. Co. v. Bourne,
(1935) 172 Miss. 620, 159 So. 841; both cases involving enforcement in
Mississippi of rights under the Louisiana Act, the possibility of which
was recognized in Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., (1930) 156 Miss.
567, 126 So. 395; see also Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, (Miss. 1935)
161 So. 699, 702.
"In re Phillips, (1923) 206 App. Div. 314, 200 N. Y. S. 639.
'
2Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct.
420, 70 L. Ed. 757. This case and the case cited in the following footnote
are discussed more fully in 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvmw 329, 330.
'
2aChicago R. I. & P. Ry. v. Elder, (1926) 270 U. S. 611, 622, 46 Sup.
Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757.
'3Dennison v. Payne, (C.C.A., 2nd Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 333, 341;
Hoffman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (C.C.A., 2nd Cir. 1934)
74 F. (2d) 227, 230. In the latter case, Augustus N. Hand, Circuit Judge,
said: "A decision of an administrative board that a workman (at the time
of an accident) was engaged in intrastate commerce is entitled to full faith
and credit and can be no more attacked collaterally than that of a court."
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state in which a Workmen's Compensation Act is in force can
recover compensation* under the Act in that state for bodily harm
arising out of and in the course of employment, although the
harm was suffered in another state, unless the Act provides in
specific words or is so interpreted as to apply only to bodily
harm occurring within the state.
"Sec. 399. Compensation Under Act of State of Harm.
Except as stated in sec. 401, a workman may recover in a
state in which he sustains harm under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of that state although the contract of employment was
made in another state, unless the Act provides in specific words
or is so interpreted as to apply only when the contract of employ-
ment is made within the state.
"Sec. 400. Neither Employment Nor Injury in State.
No recovery can be had under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of a state if neither the harm occurred nor the contract of
employment was made in the state."
Sections 398 and 399 quite properly put the emphasis upon
the specific words of the Act, or its interpretation. When the
Act is explicit, there is no problem, 14 except the constitutional
problem to be discussed later.15 An increasing number of states
cover certain situations expressly in their Acts. Some examples
will be mentioned.' Where the local Act is not explicit, various
14See discussion in 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIE-W 329, 334-335.
151nfra, pp. 34-41.
'
6In addition, see cases cited in 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 329, 334,
n. 22; see also:
ARIZONA-Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., (1927) 32 Ariz. 275, 257 Pac. 644.
GEORGiX-Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, (1928) 165 Ga. 667,
142 S. E. 121.
IDAHo-Dameron v. Yellowstone Trail Garage, (1934) 54 Idaho 646,
34 P. (2d) 417.
INDIANA-Carl Hagenback, etc. Shows Co. v. Leppert, (1917) 66 Ind.
App. 261, 117 N. E. 531.
KANsAs-Evans v. Tibbetts, (1931) 134 Kan. 131, 4 P. (2d) 399 (cf.
Davis v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., (1934) 140 Kan. 644, 38 P. (2d) 107).
MAINE-Saunder's Case, (1927) 126 Me. 144, 136 Atl. 722. For dis-
cussion of an earlier Maine case, see 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIE W 329, 342,
n. 52.
MARYLAND-Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, (1932) 163 Md.
74, 160 Ati. 804, cited infra n. 54.
MIcHIGAN-Klettke v. C. & J. Commercial Driveaway, (1930) 250
Mich. 454, 231 N. W. 132; Roberts v. I. X. L. Glass Corporation, (1932)
259 Mich. 644, 244 N. W. 188; Wearner v. West Michigan Conference of
Seventh Day Adventists, (1932) 260 Mich. 540, 245 N. W. 802 (cf. Leninger
v. Jacobs, (Mich. 1934) 257 N. W. 764).
MISSOURi-State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Compensation Com-
mission, (1928) 320 Mo. 893, 8 S. W. (2d) 897; Shout v. Gunite Concrete
& Construction Co., (1931) 226 Mo. App. 388, 41 S. W. (2d) 629; Hartman
v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., (1932) 331 Mo. 230, 53 S. W. (2d)
241; Zarnecke v. Blue Line Chemical Co., (Mo. App. 1932) 54 S. W.(2d) 772; Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (1933) 334
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theories or analogies have been used by the courts in the process
of interpretation. The Restatement, in the introductory note
to Workmen's Compensation, compresses them into three:
"first, as the substitution of a statutory tort for a common
law tort; second, as the regulation of the relationship between
employer and employee,* which is primarily contractual in char-
acter; third, as the creation of a new statutory relation between
master and servant, the hief incident of which is to impose upon
the master financial responsibility for certain risks of the service."
Of these three theories, the first one, the "tort theory," has
been used to describe the view taken by a very few courts re-
fusing to'apply the local Act to injuries sustained outside the state.
The earliest American case, in Massachusetts, took this view-',
However, in 1927 the Massachusetts Act was amended to permit
compensation under certain circumstances.18 A similar develop-
ment took place in California 9 and in Illinois.20  Pennsylvania's
Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036; Bolin v. Swift & Co., (Mo. 1934) 73 S. W.
(2d) 774; see .Elsas v. qontgomery Elevator Co., (1932) 330 Mo. 596, 50
S. W. (2d) 130. See also Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co., (D.C.
Kans. 1930) 47 F. (2d) 615; Joseph H. Weiderhoff v. Neil, (D.C. Mo.
1934) 6 F. Supp. 798; both cases involved Missouri Act.
NoaRH DAKoA-MacArthur v. No. Dak. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, (1932) 62 N. D. 572, 244 N. W. 259:1 O io-Indutrial Commission v. Gardinio, (1929) 119 Ohio St. 539,
164 NX. E. 758, followed in Johnson v. Industrial Commission, (1932) 45
Ohio App. 125, 186 N. E. 509. See infra, n. 42. For a discussion of an
earlier case, see 11 MrINNSoTA LAw REvMw 329, 344, n. 62.
TExAs-Price v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, (Tex. Comm. App.'
1927) 296 S. W. 284; same case on subsequent appeal, Texas Employers!
Ins. Ass'n v. .Price, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 300 S. W. 667, writ of error
dismissed (1927) 117 Tex. 173, 300 S. W. 672, discussed in (1928) 6
Texas L. Rev. 404; Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 68, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 473;
McGuire & Cavender v. Edwards (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d)
1010 (see n. 35, infra); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Volek, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) 44 S. W. (2d) 795, aff'd (Tex. Comm. App. 1934) 69 S. NV.
(2d) 33; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hoehn, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
72 S. W. (2d) 341; Davis v. Petroleum Casualty Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1934)- 70 S. W. (2d) 649.
VEm .or-DeGray v. Miller Bros. Coast. Co., (Vt. 1934) 173 Ad. 556,
562.
'7Gould's Case, (1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D
372, 4 N. C. C. A. 60, followed in Lemieux v. Boston & Maine R. R.,
(1914) 219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992.
'sSee Pederzoli's Case, (1930) 269 Mass. 550, 169 N. E. 427; McLaugh-
lin's Case, (1931) 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Migue's Case, (1933) 281
Mass. 373; Armburg v. Boston and Maine Railroad, (1931) 276 Mass,
418, 424, 177 N. E. 665; Wright's Case, (Mass. 1935) 197 N. E. 5.
19See North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, (1916) 174 Calif. 1,
162 Pac. 93, L. R. A. 1917E 642 (before amendment); since amendment:Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., (1920) 184 Cal. 26, 192
Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190, writ of error dismissed, (1921) 255 U. S.
445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373, 65 L. Ed. 723; Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Industrial
Acc. Comm., (1923) 64 Cal. App. 307, 221 Pac. 658; Alaska Packers' Ass'n
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Act at one time expressly excluded from its operation accidents
occurring outside the state, but in 1929 an amendment extended
the scope of the Act under quite limited conditions. 2 ' In 1931
Oklahoma first encountered this problem and interpreted its com-
pulsory Act as not applying to injuries outside the state.22
The second theory mentioned seems to refer to the "contract
theory" used by many courts in holding the local "elective" Act
applicable when the injury occurred outside the state.28 The theory
v. Industrial Acc. Comm., (1927) 200 Cal. 579, 253 Pac. 926; Alaska
Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., (1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P.
(2d) 716, aff'd (1935) 294 U. S. 532, Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 554.20See Union Bridge Co. v. Industrial Comm., (1919) 287 Ill. 396, 122
N. E. 609 (before amendment); since amendment: Beall Bros. Supply Co.
v. Industrial Commission, (1930) 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64; Johnston
v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 352 Ill. 74, 185 N. E. 191; Kennedy-
Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, (1934) 355 Ill,
519, 189 N. E. 916.21See Bock v. D. B. Frampton & Co., (1932) 106 Pa. Super. 380,
161 Atl. 762.22Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State Industrial Commission, (1931)
151 Okla. 272, 3 P. (2d) 199. To the same effect: Continental Oil Co. v.
Pitts, (1932) 158 Okla. 200, 13 P. (2d) 180. Cf. Associated Indemnity
Corporation v. Landers, (1932) 159 Okla. 190, 14 P. (2d) 950, cited
again, infra n. 87.23Cases. are cited in 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 329, 337, n. 34;
other cases are cited in the text, 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvimv 329, 337-
341. As to express statutory provisions in some states, w e n. 16.
Recent cases are:
CoNNEcrIcT-Falvey v. Sprague Motor Co., (1930) 111 Conn. 693,
151 Ati. 182 (employment began before enactment of Connecticut Act) ; see
Miller Bros. Const. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., (1931) 113 Conn. 504,
155 Atl. 709.
IOWA-Cullamore v. Groneweg & Schoentgen, (Iowa, 1934) 257 N. W.
561.
LouisrANA-Hargis v. McWilliams Co., (1928) 9 La. App. 108, 119
So. 88; Selser v. Bragman's Bluff, (La. App. 1933) 146 So. 690; see
Festervand v. Laster, (1930) 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634. But cf,
Durrett v. Eichere Woodland Lumber Co., (1931) 19 La. App. 494, 136 So.
112, 140 So. 867; Abood v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, (La. App.
1934) 155 So. 484. These cases are cited infra, n. 35.
MissouRi-State ex rel. Brewen Clark Syrup Co. v. Compensation Com-
mission, (1928) 320 Mo. 893, 8 S. W. (2d) 897 ("contract" theory used
to support application of express provision of Missouri Act; see n. 16);
Shout v. Gunite Concrete & Construction Co., (1931) 226 Mo. App. 388,
41 S. W. (2d) 629; Hartman v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., (1932)
331 Mo. 230, 53 S. W. (2d) 241; Zarnecke v. Blue Line Chemical Co., (Mo.
App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 772; Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel
Co., (1933) 334 Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036; Bolin v. Swift & Co.,(Mo. 1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 774; see Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co.,
(1932) 330 Mo. 596, 50 S. W. (2d) 130.
MONTANA-State ex rel. Loney v. State Industrial Accident Board,
(1930) 87 Mont. 191, 286 Pac. 408 (also relied on localization of business;
see n. 35).
NEw JERSEY-Hi-Heat Gas Co. v. Dickerson, (1934) 12 N. J. Misc.
151, 170 Atl. 44, aff'd (1934) 113 N. J. L. 329, 174 Atd. 483; Sweet v.
Austin Co., (1934) 12 N. J. Misc. 381, 171 Atl. 684; see Frank Desiderio
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also has been used, strangely enough, to support recovery under
the local Act when the contract of employment was made else-
where but the injury occurred within the state.2' The theory,
variously expressed by the courts, is based on the idea of an agree-
ment between the employer and employee, in "electing to come
under the Act," to make it a part of the contract of employment.
The inadequacies of the theory as a matter of contract principles
and the absurdities of reasoning in its application have been dis-
cussed in the previous article and elsewhere.25 Moreover, the
results reached in states with "compulsory" Acts do not differ
greatly from those reached under "elective" Acts.20 The apt
language of the Wisconsin court,2 7 quoted in the previous article, "
is worth repeating:
I"Neither, in our opinion, does the fact that the law has an
elective feature and is not compulsory materially affect the ques-
on. ...
Sons & Blunt, (1933) 11 N. J. Misc. 494, 167 Atl..29.
VEamox--See dicta in De Gray v. Miller Bros. Coast Co., (Vt. 1934)
173 Atl. 556 ("contract" theory adopted even though express provision in
Vermont Act; see n. 16).
24See discussion of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Indiana cases in
11 MINNESOTA LAW REvw 329, 337-341. See also DeGray v. Miller
Bros. Const. Co., (Vt 1934) 173 At. 556, 562-563.
2 5 See 11 MINNEsOrA LAw REVEW 329, 337-341, referring to criticisms
by other writers. See also (1935) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 85.
2 6It is believed that the statement in the text is justified by a compari-
son of the results reached under the two types of Acts, as was done in the
previous article and, to some extent, in this article.
An interesting case from this angle is Hilding v. Department of Labor
and Industries, (1931) 162 Wash. 168, 298 Pac. 321. It was the first case
before the court on the question of the application of the Washington Act
to a workman employed in Washington but injured outside the state. In
holding the Act to apply, the court quoted from cases in states with "elec-
tive" Acts. One of the quotations used the "contract" theory. Yet Wash-
ington is listed as. one of the states having "compulsory" Acts. United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 496, Workmen's Compen-
sation Legislation of the United States and Canada as of January 1,
1929, at p. 11. The court made no mention of that.
27Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis. 106, 113,
115, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935..
2Sll MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 329, 345.
Compare the illuminating statements by the California court with refer-
ence to the provision in its "compulsory" Act that the Act should apply
to injuries suffered outside the state where the contract was made in the
state. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., (1920) 184 Calif.
26, 36, 44, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190, writ of error dismissed (1921)
255 U. S. 445, 41 S. Ct. 373, 65 L. Ed. 723. The statement is quoted in
11 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 335.
Compare also the language of Judge Cardozo, quoted in 11 MiNNEsoTA
LAw REvmw 329, 343, as to liability under the "compulsory" New York
Act, in Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 9, 119 N. E.
878, Ann. Cas. 1918D 316.
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"The liability of the employer under the Act being statutory,
the Act enters into and becomes a part of every contract, not
as a covenant thereof, but to the extent that the law of the land
is a part of every contract."
The third theory may be regarded, perhaps, as implicit in
many of the cases. The closest explicit judicial statement prob-
ably is that of the Arizona court :29
"We therefore hold that the present Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is neither elective nor contractual in its nature, but, on the
contrary, that it rests upon the police power to regulate the status
of employer and employee within the state of Arizona, and that
no contract, express or implied, made within or without the state
of Arizona, unless expressly so authorized by our law, can of
itself affect the rights and duties of such status. It is governed,
so far as this subject is concerned, solely by the provisions of the
Arizona statutes, and nothing else."
It is not to be supposed that other theories or formulas have
not been attempted by courts. The more important ones will be
mentioned presently. The common factor in all of the theories is
the attempt to find some act or acts, relation or situation within
the jurisdiction to which the local Act will attach legal conse-
quences. Sections 198 and 199 suggest that the making of the
contract and the injury are the only significant facts. The follow-
ing discussion bears on that suggestion.
One of the most interesting developments since the previous
article has been the spreading influence of the Minnesota court's
"business localization" theory. This theory was expressed first
as follows :s0
"When a business is localized in a state there is nothing in-
consistent with the principle of the Compensation Act in requiring
the employer to compensate for injuries in a service incident to
its conduct sustained beyond the borders of the state."
The Minnesota court has used this theory consistently. 1 In
a number of cases the Minnesota Act was applied where the in-
jury occurred outside of the state. In some of the cases it appears
from the report that the contract of employment was made in
29Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Com., (1927) 32
Ariz. 275, 282, 283, 257 Pac. 644. The contract was assumed to have been
made in California; the injury occurred in Arizona. The Arizona Act
was held to apply.
The opinion contains a good criticism of the "contract" theory.
80State ex rel. Lena Chambers v. District Court, (1918) 139 Minn.
205, 166 N. W. 185, 3 A. L. R. 1347.
31See McClintock, Minnesota Annotations to the Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws, sec. 398 and 399, p. 94-95.
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Minnesota, although that fact is not stressed ;3 in some, the
place of contract is not mentioned.33  In one case the theory was
used in applying the Minnesota Act where the contract was made
outside the state but the injury occurred within the state, the
place of injury not being stressed.34
In an increasing number of states this "busineis localization"
is regarded as an' important factor in determining whether the
local Act will be applied.3
A somewhat similar theory has been worked out in the more
3 2State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court, (1918) 139 Minn. 205,
166 N. W. 185, 3 A. L. R. 1347 (for subsequent history of this case, see
State ex rel. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. District Court, (1919)
141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 218); State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v.
District Court, (1918) 140 Minn. 427, 168 N. W. 177; State ex rel. Mc-
Carthy Bros. v. District Court, (1918) 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274;
Krekelberg v. M. A. Floyd Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 149, 207 N. IV. 193.
-
33Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Company, (1921) 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.
W. 977, 20 A. L. R. 316 (merely stated that the employee "was employed
by the Minneapolis branch"); Bradtmiller v. Liquid Carbonic Co., (1928)
173 Minn. 481, 217 N. W. 680; Brameld v. Albert Dickinson Co., (1932)
186 Minn. 89, 242 N. W. 465.
34Ginsburg v. Byers, (1927) 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55.
35IXDIANA--Smith v. Menzies Shoe Co., (1934) 98 Ind. App. 132, 188
N -E. 592 (contract made in Illinois; injury in Indiana; employer's principal
office in Missouri and no place of business in Indiana; recovery under
Indiana Act denied); Finkley v. Eugene Saenger Tailoring Shop, (Ind.
App. 1935) 196 N. E. 536.
IowA-Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lundquist, (1928) 206
Iowa 499, 221 N. W. 228 (citing a Minnesota case) ; but cf. Cullamore v.
Groneweg & Schoentgen, (Iowa 1934) 257 N. V. 561, cited supra, n. 23(in applying Iowa Act, court relied on "contract" theory although em-
ployer's principal place of business was in Iowa).
LoufsIaNA-Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., (1931) 19 La.
App. 494, 136 So. 112, 140 So. 867 (quoting from a Minnesota case) ; Abood
v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation, (La. App. 1934) 155 So. 484. But cf.
Hargis v. McWilliams Co., (1928) 9 La. App. 108, 119 So. 88; Festerland v.
Laster, (1930) 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634; Selser v. Bragman's Bluff,(La. App. 1933) 146 So. 690. These cases are cited supra, n. 23.
MONTANA-State ex rel. Loney v. State Industrial Accident Board,(1930) 87 Mont. 191, 286 Pac. 408 (quoting from Minnesota case; also
relying on "contract" theory, see n. 23.)
NEBPsAsKA-Watts v. Long, (1928) 116 Neb. 656, 218 N. W. 410, 59
A. L. R. 728 (citing Minnesota case; mere fact of the contract being made
in Nebraska was not controlling); Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaubenbaugh, (1930)
119 Neb. 698, 230 N. W. 688 (citing, on this point, only a Minnesota case) ;
Freeman y. Higgini, (1932) 123 Neb. 73, 242 N. W. 271; Stone v. Thomson
Co., (1932) 124 Neb. 181, 245 N. W. 600; Esau v. Smith Bros.,(1933) 124 Neb. 217, 246 N. W. 230 (Nebraska Act applied though con-
tract was made in Kansas) ; Penwell v. Anderson, (1933) 125 Neb. 449.
-250 N. W.-665, noted in (1934) 12 Neb. L. Bull. 275; Rigg v. Atlantic,
Pacific & Gulf Oil Co., (Neb. 1935) 261 N. W. 900. These cases show that
Nebraska closely approaches the Minnesota "business localization" theory.
TEXAs-See McGuire & Cavender v. Edwards, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932)
48 S. W. (2d) 1010, 1012 (interpreting express provision of Texas Act; see
fi. 16, supra).
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recent New York cases,3 6 the emphasis being upon the location of
the employment rather than the location of the employer's busi-
ness.3T In 1930, in Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co.,38 Judge Lehman
formulated the theory:
"The test in all cases is the place where the employment is
located.
"When the course of employment requires the workman to
perform work beyond the borders of the state, a close question
may at times be presented as to whether the employment is
located here.... The facts in each case, rather than juristic con-
cepts, will govern. . . . Occasional transitory work beyond the
state may reasonably be said to be work performed in the course
of employment here; employment confined to work at a fixed
place in another state is not employment within the state, for this
state is concerned only remotely, if at all, with the conditions of
such employment."
This test has been applied in later New York cases. 9 The
difficulties in application are shown by the number of reversed
36For a discussion of the earlier New York cases, see 11 MINNEsorA
LAw REViEW 329, 342-344.
37This difference in emphasis is pointed out in Judge Lehman's dis-
senting opinion in Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corporation, (1932) 259 N. Y.
126, 181 N. E. 72, discussed infra n. 41.
In Beale, The Conflict of Laws, sec. 398.4, p. 1321, it is said: "This
present doctrine of the New York courts seems a variety of the localization
theory" (the Minnesota theory, discussed in sec. 398.3, p. 1320). However,
results reached under the two theories may well differ. See n. 38.
38(1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622; remittitur amended, (1930)
253 N. Y. 559, 171 N. E. 782, discussed again infra, n. 51. The employer
was constructing a road in New York. The employee was employed only
for work in Canada, where the injury occurred, in a sand pit which was
operated solely to provide sand and gravel for the New York road. Com-
pensation under the New York Act was denied. A different result might
be reached in Minnesota. Cf. Brameld v. Albert Dickinson Co., (1932) 186
Minn. 89, 242 N. W. 465, cited supra, n. 33 (court said that employee was
within the Minnesota Act "though he worked outside the state"). On the
other hand, Minnesota probably would agree with the decision of the ma-jority in Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corporation, (1932) 259 N. Y. 126,
181 N. E. 72, discussed infra, n. 41.
39Baum v. New York Air Terminals, (1930) 230 App. Div. 531, 245
N. Y. S. 357 (reversing award); Copeland v. Foundation Co., (1931) 256
N. Y. 568, 177 N. E. 143 (reversal); Amaxis v. N. A. Vassiloros, (1931)
232 App. Div. 397, 250 N. Y. S. 201 (dissenting opinion), reversed in (1931)
258 N. Y. 544, 180 N. E. 325; Proper v. Polley, (1931) 233 App. Div. 621,
253 N. Y. S. 530 (reversing award; two judges dissenting), aff'd (1932)
259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. E. 161 (injury in New York; contract in Pennsyl-
vania); Kalfatis v. Commercial Printing Co., (1931) 233 App. Div. 649,
254 N. Y. S. 519 (reversing award) ; Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corpora-
tion, (1932) 259 N. Y. 126, 181 N. E. 72 (reversal; dissenting opinion; see
discussion in n. 41); Walsh v. Apartment Engineering & Contracting Co.,
(1933) 240 App. Div. 919, 267 N. Y. S. 872 (two judges dissenting);
Zeltoski v. Osborne Drilling Corporation, (1933) 239 App. Div. 235, 267
N. Y. S. 855 (one judge dissenting), reversed (1934) 264 N. Y. 1, 191
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cases and dissenting opinions,4 and particularly by the 1932
case of Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corporation,4 in which Judge
Lehman dissented.
A somewhat similar test is suggested by the language in recent
Ohio42 and Colorado 3 cases.
The recent Wisconsin cases afford an interesting comparison."'
In the 1929 case of Wandersee v. Moskewitz45 recovery under the
Wisconsin Act was denied for an injury outside the state, even
though the contract was made in Wisconsin, because no services
under the contract were rendered in that state and hence the
N. E. 532; Seely v. Phoenix Transit Co., (1934) 241 App. Div. 183, 272
N. Y. S. 127.
' Compare the following decisions rendered without opinions or citation
of cases: Hughes v. Waterson, Berlii & Snyder Co., (1930) 254 N. Y. 607,
173 N. 1- 887; Matter of Tallman v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., (1932)
-259 N. Y. 512, 182 N. F. 159; Industrial Commissioner v. Underwood,
Elliott Fisher Co., (1935) 243 App. Div. 658, 276 N. Y. S. 518 (per curiam
opinion; no discussion or citation of cases; for later history of this case
see (App. Div. 1935) 282 N. Y. S. 229) ; Goddard v. Taylor Instrument Co.,
(App. Div.- 1935) 282 N. Y. S. 182 (per curiam opinion; no citation of cases).
40Reversals and dissenting opinions are indicated in n. 39.
41(1932) 259 N. Y. 126, 181 N. E. 72. The employer's principal place
of business was in New York; it erected advertising signs throughout the
country. The employee had worked for this employer in New York; after
short employment with another, he returned to this employer and worked
in New York for a few days before he was sent to Pennsylvania, where the
injury occurred. The majority held that the New York Act applied. The
two opinions seem to show some difference of opinion as to the interpreta-
tion of the evidence. The majority opinion quotes evidence that but for the
injury the employee would have been employed in New York on his re-
turn. Judge Lehman denied that there was any "general employment" in
New York.
42Indutrial Commission v. Gardinio, (1929) 119 Ohio St. 539, 164
N. E. 758 (interpreting express provision of Ohio Act, see supra, n. 16),
followed in Johnson v. Industrial Commission, (1932) 45 Ohio App. 125,
186 N. E. 509. For a discussion of an earlier Ohio case, see 11 MI.NEsorA
Iw RmIw 329, 344, n. 62.
43Platt v. Reynolds, (1929) 86 Colo. 397, 282 Pac. 264; Tripp v. In-
dustrial Commission, (-1931) 89 Colo. 512, 4 P. 2d) 917; Home Insurance
Co. v. Hopp, (1932) 91 Colo. 495, 15 P. (2d) 1082 (place of contract not
sole criterion, but where contract is made in Colorado and a "substantial
portion!' of services performed there, Colorado Act is applied even though
injury in' another state). Earlier Colorado cases were discussed in 11
MiNNEsoTA LAw Rnviaw 329, 337-338, n. 34.
The later Colorado cases rely much on Wandersee v. Moskewitz, (1929)
198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837, cited infra n. 45.
"The earlier case of Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169
Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935 is cited and quoted from supra,
n. 27; for a fuller discussion of the case, see 11 MINNESOTA LAW RLmW
329, 345. That case was followed in Zurich Accident & Liability Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Commission, (1927) 193 Wis. 32, 213 N. W. 630.
45(1929) 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837. The employee was a resident
of Minnesota, but the court did not stress that. The case was distinguished
on the facts in Threshermen's Natl. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
(1930) 201 Wis. 303, 230 N. W. 67.
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Act had not become a part of the contract of employment. In
1930,4" this doctrine was limited in favor of employees who are
Wisconsin residents in order to protect the state's interest in its
residents and their dependents. The court spoke of a "construc-
tive status" under the Wisconsin Act being created until the em-
ployee acquired an "actual status as an employee in some other
state" (apparently by changing residence). A year later 47 the
court said that this "constructive status" must mean that con-
structively the services are being performed in Wisconsin and
raised the question of whether the status was fiction or reality.
In 193348 the court said that if the constructive status is a fiction,
it is justifiable in order to protect the employee and to protect
the state "from the consequences of pauperism."
To return to sections 198 and 199 of the Restatement, the
foregoing discussion of the cases shows" that there is ample
authority, on one theory or another, or by express statutory pro-
vision, for the statements that the local Act may be applied when
the contract of employment was made in the state or the harm was
sustained there. However, the inference from these sections that
those are the only significant facts simply is not true in a grow-
ing number of states.
Must at least one of those facts exist for the local Act to be
applied? Section 400 flatly states that it must. The same state-
ment is made in Professor Beale's treatise, 49 citing four cases.
Two of those cases are relatively early New York decisions by
lower courts."0 The later New York cases discussed above do
46Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, (1930) 201 Wis. 474, 230 N. W.
622, discussed in (1930) 6 Wis. L. Rev. 61. The contract was made in
Wisconsin for services entirely outside the state. The case was remanded
to the Industrial Commission in order to have findings on the matter of
"status."
4Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1931) 203 Wis.
466, 477, 234 N. W. 889. The actual holding of this case was to apply the
Wisconsin Act to an injury which occurred in Wisconsin during temporary
work under a contract made in Iowa. Other aspects of this case are dis-
cussed infra, n. 86.
48McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 212
Wis. 507; 514, 250 N. W. 396. The actual holding of the case is discussed
infra, n. 56.
492 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, sec. 401.1, p. 1322.
5OThompson v. Foundation Co., (1919) 188 App. Div. 506, 177 N. Y. S.
58. This case was cited in the previous article as holding that "there can
be no recovery under the Act when the contract was not made in New
York and the injury was abroad." 11 MINN.SOTA LAW R~visw 329, 343,
n. 59. The injury was in Pennsylvania. The majority opinion discussed
only whether the contract was made in New York, the award for the
employee having been granted solely on that basis. Thus the proposition
was assumed rather than discussed. The theory of the earlier New York
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not emphasize the place of contriact as much as the earlier cases
did in determining whether the New York Act applies to injuries
outside the state.!I Another case cited is a 1925 Indiana case
from an-intermediate appellate court.52  The court in that case
stressed the fact that the contract was neither made nor to be
performed in Indiana. The fourth case: cited is a 1919 case from
an intermediate appellate court of Ohio 3 in which the court
relied in part on the fact that no work was to be done by
the employee in Ohio. A stronger case, which might have been
cited, is a 1932 Maryland decision" which relied on this section of
the Restatement in its then form. 5 On the other hand, a 1933
Wisconsin case16 seems directly contra.
cases gave support to the assumption. See 11 MiNNSOrA LAw REvIEw 329,
342-343.
The other case cited is Baggs v. Standard Oil Co., (Sup. CL, Special
Term, 1920) 180 N. Y. S. 560, cited in 11 Miz;NESOrA LAW REvmw 329,
344, n. 61. The court (one judge) said, "But where the injured party is
not a resident of this state, and where he was not hired within the state,
and where he rendered no service within the state, the . . Act does not
apply."
51In Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co., (1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E.
622, remittitur amended (1930) 253 N. Y. 559, 171 N. E. 782, discussed
supra, n. 38, it is not even stated in the report where the contract was made.
More emphasis, however, was placed on the place of contract, along with
other factors, in Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corporation, (1932) 259 N. Y.
126, 181 N. W. 72, discussed supra, n. 41.
52Bemont Oil Corporation v. Cubbison, (1925) 84 Ind. App. 22, 149
N. E. 919, discussed in 11 MINNEsrA LAW RavmxW 329, 340, n. 46.
The Indiana cases are quite confusing. The earlier cases are discussed
in 11 MiNNESOTA LAW RvImw 329, 339-341. Recent cases are: Bishop v.
International Sugar Feed Co., (1928) 87 Ind. App. 509, 162 N. E. 71 (fol-
lowing Darsch v. Thearle, Duffield, etc. Co., (1922) 77 Ind. App. 357, 133
N. E. 525, discussed in -11 MINNFSOTA LAw REvImw 329, 340, n. 44);
Premier Const. Co. v. Grinstead, (1930) 91 Ind. App. 163, 170 N. E. 561
(general contract of employment made in Indiana to work wherever work
happened to be; employee lived in Kentucky and was directed to go on a
job to Kentucky where the injury occurred; Indiana Act held not to
apply) ; Smith v. Menzies Shoe Co., (1934) 98 Ind. App. 132, 188 N. E.
592, cited supra, n. 35.
531ndustrial Commission v. Ware, (1919) 10 Ohio App. 375, discussed
in 11 MINN FsorA LAW REvImv 329, 344, n. 62. The more recent Ohio
cases are cited in n. 16 and n. 42.
54Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, (1932) 163 Mid. 74, 83-84,
160 Atl. 804, cited supra n. 16 (interpreting express provision of Maryland
Act).
55Proposed Final Draft No. 3,.Niarch 10, 1932, section 438. This sec-
tion was practically the same as the present section 400.
56McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 212
Wis. 507, 511-513, 250 N. W. 396, cited supra, n. 48. The injury occurred
in Illinois. It was contended that the contract was made in Illinois. The
court answered that it made no difference where the contract was made.
See 'lso dicta in Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, (1930) 201 Wis. 474,
481, 230 N. W. 622, discussed in (1930) 6 Wis. L. Rev. 61, cited supra, n. 46.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The full rigor of section 400 is softened somewhat by a com-
ment to section 398:
"a. Employment through agency. The case of employment
through an employment agency in one state, where the entire
business is carried on in another state, and the applicant is merely
sent to the principal office to report, is specially treated. In such
a case, the relation is regarded as established not by the action
of the agency, but by the workman reporting for work at the
principal office of the business, the transaction at the employment
office not being regarded as definitive hiring. In that case, the
Compensation Act of the state where the workman reports for
duty governs compensation."
It is often a difficult problem, of course, to determine in
which state the contract of employment was made.5" The position
taken by the comment seems highly sensible (even though it may
depart in some situations from the technical rules as to the "place
of contracting,") 58 at least to the extent that it permits the
Act of the place where the work is actually done to be applied.5 '
However, the comment is limited in scope. It does not go
to the heart of the problem of section 400. Suppose this situation:
the employer's principal place of business is in State X, but
some business is carried on in States Y and Z; the employee is
hired in Y under an agreement to go where he is sent; he works
for a short time in Y and then is sent to X where he is put
to work on a job of a permanent nature which he carries on for
a long time; in an emergency he is sent to Z on a temporary
57See, for example, Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (1933)
334 Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036 (see discussion infra, n. 59) ; Leininger
v. Jacobs, (Mich. 1934) 257 N. W. 764 (application for employment made
in Michigan; employer later telephoned from Michigan instructions to
foreman in employer's Ohio garage to put employer to work; telephone
message regarded as "acceptance" in Michigan so as to make a "Michigan
contract") ; Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,(1935) 2 Cal. (2nd) 685, 43 P. (2d) 283 (authority of California agent
to make contract for work outside the state) ; Radford v. Smith Bros.,(1932) 123 Neb. 13, 241 N. W. 753 (new contract of employment held to
have been made in Nebraska); Davis v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., (1934)
140 Kans. 644, 38 P. (2d) 107; Rigg v. Atlantic, Pacific & Gulf Oil Co.,
(Neb. 1935) 261 N. W. 900.
58See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 311 and 328.
591t does not follow that the Act of the state of contracting might not
be applicable also, at least where other factors exist. Daggett v. Kansas City
Structural Steel Co., (1933) 334 Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036 (contract
regarded as made in Missouri through fellow applicant for work as em-
ployer's agent; employee reported for work in Kansas, where he was in-jured; Missouri Act applied on basis of express provision plus fact that
employer was a "major employer" in Missouri); Los Angeles & S. L. R.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, (1935) 2 Cal. (2nd) 685, 43 P.(2d) 282 (similar situation).
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piece of work with instructions to return to X when the work is
finished; he is injured in Z. If X were Minnesota or New York,
or one of the states tending to take similar views, it is asserted
with some confidence; on the basis of the recent cases discussed
above, that X would apply its Act to the injury, section 400 to
the contrary notwithstanding.
This discussion of when the local Act will be applied is not
complete without a consideration of constitutional limitations which
will be treated, among other matters, under the next heading.
III. EFFECT OF REMEDY UNDER ACT OF A STATE UPON REM-
EDIES IN THE SAME OR OTHER STATES-CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS.
The pertinent sections of the Restatement are:
- "Sec. 401. Abolition of right of action for common law
tort or wrongful death.
-"If the cause of action in tort or an action for wrongful
death either against the employer or against a third person has
been abolished by a Workmen's Compensation Act of the place
where the contract of employment was made or of the place of
wrong, no action can be maintained for such tort or wrongful death
in any state.
"Sec. 402. Effect of two acts governing injury.
"Proceedings may be brought in a state under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of that state, if it is applicable, although the
Act of another state also is applicable."
Where the Act of the state of injury applies and purports to
provide an exclusive remedy, there is considerable authority that
a tort action,80 or an action for wrongful death," ' will not lie in
80Albanese v. Stewart,-(1912) 78 Misc. Rep. 581, 138 N. Y. S. 942;
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (1914) 87 Misc. Rep. 156, 149
N. Y. S. 1035 (contract and injury both in New Jersey; court stressed
place of contract); Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., (1913) 35
R. I. 321, 87 Ati. 1, L. R. A. 1916A 428, 4 N. C. C. A. 600; Johnson v.
Nelson, (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620; Christ v. Chicago & North-
western Ry. Co., (1929) 176 Min. 592, 224 N. W. 247; Boanner v. Tucker
Stevedoring Co., (1916) 25 Pa. Dist. Rep. 600; Mitchell v. St. Louis Smelt-
ing & Refining Co., (1919) 202 Mo. App. 251, 215 S. W. 506; Taylor v.
Integrity Mut. Cas. Co., (1924) 216 Mo. App. 599, 265 S. V. 881; Bozo
v. Central Coal & Coke Co., (1919) 54 Utah 289, 180 Pac. 432, (1920) 57
Utah 243, 193 Pac. 1111 (point assumed without discussion) ; Shurtliff v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., (1925) 66 Utah 161, 241 Pac. 1058 (point as-
sumed) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, (1933) 188 Ark. 177, 65 S. W.
(2d) 1 (contract, service thereunder, and injury all in Texas); Cox v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1933) 332 Mo. 991, 61 S. W. (2d) 962. Contra,
Johnson v. C. C. & 0. Ry. Co., (1926) 191 N. C. 75i 131 S. E. 390, dis-
cussed in 11 MIfNNEsoTA LAw REV w 329, 349 (both contract and injury
in Tennessee; plaintiff a resident of North Carolina), followed in Lee v.
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another state. This would seem to follow from the usual rule that
tort liability is governed by the law of the place of injury,02 and
most of the cases so argue. Less clear is the situation where the
Act of a state other than the state of injury applies, and the
cases have reached divergent results.0 8 Of course, where the court
finds that the Act of no state applies to the injury, other relief
will be granted."
A new element was introduced into the problem when the
United States Supreme Court, in 1932, in Bradford Electric
Chemical Construction Co., (1931) 200 N. C. 319, 156 S. E. 848.
Compare Beyer v. Hamburg-American S. S. Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1907)
171 Fed. 582 (involving German compensation law).
6OPrdich v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., (1920) 111 Misc. Rep. 430, 183 N. Y.
S. 77; see Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., (1930) 156 Miss. 567, 126
So. 395; cf. Anderson v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., (1925) 124 Misc. 829,
209 N. Y. S. 493; Resigno v. F. Jarka Co., (1927) 221 App. Div. 214, 223
N..Y. S. 5.
62 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 378, 384 (2), 391 (wrongful
death).
o3Cases denying other relief are: Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel
Co., (1920) 227.N. Y. 531, 125 N. Y. 675, discussed in 11 MINNEsOrA LAW
REVIEW 329, 348 (action under wrongful death statute of New York, where
fatal injury occurred, held barred by provisions of "optional" Act of New
Jersey, where contract was made, the employee having "accepted" the
provisions of the Act) ; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis.
106, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935, discussed in 11 MINNEsoTA LAW RE-
viEw 329, 351 (recovery under survival statute of Michigan, where injury
occurred, denied because Act of Wisconsin, where the contract was made,
applied). See Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co., (D.C. Kans. 1930)
47 F. (2d) 615.
Cases granting other relief are: Farr v. Babcock Lumber Co., (1921)
182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E. 833, discussed in 11 MINNESoTA LAW REvIEW 329,
348 (tort action allowed in North Carolina in spite of Act of Tennessee,
where contract was made; court's language in terms of construction of Ten-
nessee Act, but the later North Carolina cases, cited in n. 60, have gone
further) ; Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Burnett, (1933) 188 Ark. 491, 66 S. W.
(2d) 637 (contract, made in Louisiana, provided that Louisiana Act only
should determine liability for injuries; tort action allowed in Arkansas,
where injury occurred).
Compare cases involving Acts of foreign countries. Schweitzer v.
Hamburg-Am. Line, (1912) 78 Misc. Rep. 448, 138 N. Y. S. 944; The Falco
(D.C. N.Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 604 (in admiralty).
The cases cited above do not include cases based upon the full faith
and credit and due process clauses, which are discussed below.
64Hamm v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., (1916) 88 N. J. L. 564, 97 Atl.
730 (contract and injury in New York; tort action not barred by New
Jersey Act which did not apply) ; Reynolds v. Day, (1914) 79 Wash. 499,
140 Pac. 681, L. R. A. 1916A 432, 5 N. C. C. A. 814 (action for damages
for injury in Idaho not barred by "public policy" of Washington Act);
Cogliano v. Ferguson, (1917) 228 Mass. 147. 117 N. E. 45 (Massachusetts
Act did not apply to injury in Maine and hence did not bar tort action).
Compare Marra v. Hamburg-Am. P. A. Geselischaft, (1917) 180 App.
Div. 75, 167 N. Y. S. 74 (involving German Act).
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Light Co. v Clapper,6 5 invoked the full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution. That case was an action, removed to
the federal court, for damages brought by the employee's admin-
istratrix under the New Hampshire Employers' Liability and
Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for such an action
or for compensation at the election of the employee. The employer,
a citizen and resident of Vermont, had its principal place of busi-
ness there and lines extending into New Hampshire. The em-
ployee, a resident of Vermont, was employed there for service
in either state; he was sent to New Hampshire to restore some
fuses and was killed while so doing. The Vermont "elective"
Act expressly provided for compensation for injuries outside the
state and for a presumed agreement that the remedy under the Act
should be exclusive. Neither party "elected" to reject the Act
by filing the necessary statement. Mr. Justice Brandeis, deliver-
ing the opinion of the court, held that, under the full faith and
credit clause, the *New Hampshire courts could not "disregard
the rights of the parties as determined by the laws of Vermont."
Mr. Justice- Stone concurred on the ground that it could be as-
sumed that the New Hampshire courts would apply the Vermont
Act, but he doubted whether the full faith and credit clause would
compel that result. The opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis was
rather guarded, as shown by its concluding sentence:
"We have no occasion to consider whether if the injured em-
ployee had been a resident of New Hampshire, or had been con-
tinuously employed there, or had left dependents there, recovery
might validly have been permitted under New Hampshire law."
The Clapper Case was distinguished a year later in Ohio v.
Chattanooga Boiler & Tak Co.60 on the ground that the Tennes-
-see Act, there involved, as construed by the highest court of Ten-
nessee, did *not preclude recovery under the Act of another state,
Ohio. It has been pointed out with reason by Professor Beale"'
that there may have been a misunderstanding of the Tennessee
case6 " which merely held that the proceeding for compensation in
Tennessee would be dismissed because the claimant had obtained
65(1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026, 82 A. L R.
696.
66(1933) 289 U. S. 439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663, 77 L. Ed. 1307.
67Beale, Two Cases on Jurisdiction, (1935) 48 Harv. L Rev. 620, 622;
2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, sec. 4012, p. 1325-1326.
68Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (1931) 163 Tenn. 420,
648, 43 S. W. (2d) 221, 45 S. W. (2d) 528.
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an award, on which some payments had been made, under the
Ohio Act.
Section 401 of the Restatement clearly is based, in part, upon
the Clapper Case. Comment b to that section states:
"Effect of Constitution of United States. If the Compen-
sation Act of the state where the contract of employment is
made abolishes the common law or statutory right of action either
as a result of the fact that the employment was entered into in
that state or by reason of the election of the parties to come
within the operation of that Act, no action can be maintained in
any state irrespective of where the workman was injured or
killed. This result is required as between states of the United
States under the full faith and credit clause of the constitution."
The Clapper Case, its implications, its relation to other branches
of conflict of laws, and its desirability have been discussed ably by
Professor Beale and others.69 Suffice it to say here that the
Restatement treats the case broadly in one respect and narrowly
in another. The broad treatment consists in recognizing the
act of making the contract as alone sufficient for the application of
the doctrine. This certainly is questionable in view of the care-
fully restricted language of Mr. Justice Brandeis quoted above and
in view of the facts of the case, e. g., that the employer's principal
place of business was in Vermont. The narrow treatment con-
sists in limiting the doctrine to the abolition of tort or wrongful
death remedies. This is the clear inference from section 401
.and section 402 taken together. Specifically, doesn't the doctrine
of the Clapper Case include also remedies under workmen's com-
pensation Acts of other states? The language of the case itself
does not exclude such a possibility. The Chattanooga Case seems
to indicate that the doctrine would have precluded a remedy under
the Ohio Act but for the supposed limiting construction of the
Tennessee Act by the Tennessee court. Furthermore, the cases
in lower federal courts and in the state courts have not treated the
doctrine so narowly.
Those cases which have cited the Clapper Case are fairly
numerous. Some of them are worth special mention.70 In an
89Beale, Two Cases on Jurisdiction, (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 622; 2
Beale, Conflict of Laws, sec. 401.2, p. 1323-1326; Dunlap, The Conflict of
Laws and Workmen's Compensation, (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. 381. 'See also
the following notes: (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 131; (1932) 42 Yale L. J. 115;
(1933) 27 Ill. L. Rev. 573; (1932) 11 No. Car. L. Rev. 116; (1932) 46
Harv. L. Rev. 291; (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 648, 649. See also Lorenzen and
Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, (1935) 83 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 555, 580.
7
°See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. .Turner, (1933) 188 Ark. 177,
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Illinois case,71 involving facts very similar to those in the Clapper
Case, an award to the employee's widow under the Illinois Act
was refused on the ground that the only remedy was under the
Indiana Act, on the authority of the Clapper Case. Likewise,
a federal district court72 of Missouri enjoined the Missouri work-
men's compensation commission from taldng jurisdiction, thus
compelling it to give full faith and credit to the Illinois Act under
the doctrine of the Clapper Case. On the other hand, the Clapper
Case was regarded as distinguishable in a Nebraska cases8 and
as not preventing the application of the Nebraska Act in spite of
the provisions of the Act of Kansas where the contract was made.
The Nebraska court referred as "cautionary" to the last sentence,
quoted above, of the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, talked of
"our public policy," and emphasized the fact that the corporate
employer, while domiciled in Texas, had its only headquarters for
the conduct of the industry at the time of the accident in Nebraska,
where the industry was being carried on and where the employee
resided and was injured. Similarly, the court in a Missouri case7'
regarded the Clapper Case as supporting rather than preventing
an award under the Act of Missouri, where the contract was made,
the injury occurring in Kansas. The court considered the con-
tention that, under the full faith and credit and due process
clauses of the federal Constitution and the Clapper Cae, one
state could not "seize upon some act casually occurring within
its jurisdiction" as a means of applying its Act in denial of the
application of the Act of another state where "all the permanent,
65 S. W. (2d) 1, cited supra, n. 60; Henriksen, v. Crandic Stages, (1933)
216 Iowa 643, 246 N. W. 913, citid infra, n. 97; Bolin v. Swift & Co., (Mo.
1934) 73 S. W. (2d) 774, cited supra, n. 16 and 23; McKesson-Fuller-
Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 212 Wis. 507, 250 N. W.
396, cited supra a. 48 and 56, and infra, n. 83; Ford, Bacon & Davis v.
Volentine, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 800, cited supra, n. 10, infra,
n. 106; Betts v. Southern Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787,
cited infra, n. 100; Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, (Miss. 1935) 161 So.
699; De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., (Vt. 1934) 173 At. 556.
Compare following cases decided before the Clapper Case: Beall Bros.
Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1930) 341 I1. 193, 173 N. E. 64;
American Mut. Liability Co. v. McCaffrey, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1930) 37 F.
(2d) 870, cert. denied (1930) 281 U. S. 751, 50 S. Ct. 354, 74 L Ed. 1162.
7'Cole v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. F_. 520,
90 A. L. R. 116.
72joseph H. Weiderhoff v. Neal, (D.C. Mo. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 798.7BEsau v.. Smith Bros., (1933) 124 Neb. 217, 246 N. W. 230, cited
supra, a. 35.7
"Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (1933) 334 Mo. 207,
65 S. W. (2d) 1036. Cf. Migue's Case, (1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. F_.
847.
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intended, and important elements of the employment are located."
The court said that it had no fault to find with this contention, but
denied that such was the situation in the case since not only was
the contract made in Missouri but lso the employer was a "major
employer operating under" the Missouri Act.
The United States Supreme Court entered the field again in
1935, in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission
of California,75 decided after the publication of the Restatement
and of Professor Beale's treatise. The employee, a nonresident
alien, and the employer, doing business in California, executed
in California a written contract of employment. The employee
agreed to work in Alaska during the salmon canning season; the
employer agreed to transport him to Alaska, and, at the end of
the season, to return him to California where he was to be paid
his wages, less advances. The contract provided that the parties
should be subject to the Alaska Act. The "compulsory" California
Act expressly provided for compensation for injuries outside
the state "where the injured employee is a resident of this state
at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in
this state." It had been held in California that this provision
applied to nonresidents on the ground that the privileges and im-
munities clause of the federal Constitution prevented giving effect
to the requirement that the employee be a resident. 0 The Cali-
fornia Act also expressly provided that no contract should exempt
the employer from liability under the Act. The Alaska "elective"
Act provided for suit in the courts of the territory, brought in
the judicial division where the injury occurred. 77  On his return
from Alaska, the employee received an award under the California
75(U.S 1935) 55 Sup. Ct. 518, discussed ably in Dunlap, The Conflict
of Laws and Workmen's Compensation, (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. 381; see
also (1935) 35 Colum. L. Rev. 751.
76Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., (1920) 184 Calif.
26, 192 Pac. 1021, 12 A. L. R. 1190, writ of error dismissed, (1921) 255
U. S. 445, 41 S. Ct. 373, 65 L. Ed. 723. See also on this point Bement
Oil Corporation v. Cubbison, (1925) 84 Ind. App. 22, 149 N. E. 919;
Roberts v. I. X. L. Glass Corporation, (1932) 259 Mich. 644, 244 N. W.
188; but see Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, (1932) 163 Md. 74,
160 At. 804. Strictly speaking, the Quong Ham Wah case decided only
as to citizens of other states, but the case was regarded as applying to all
nonresidents in the Alaska Packers case. For a critical discussion of that
point, see (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. 449.
77The Alaska Act also forbade suit under the Act outside Alaska
except where service on the defendant could not be obtained in Alaska.
in this case service could be obtained in Alaska. It was contended in the
United States Supreme Court that the limitation on suits outside Alaska
was invalid, and the Court so assumed. 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 523. For a
discussion of that question, see 11 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 329, 331.
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Act. The award was affirmed by the California Supreme Court 8
in an able opinion which cited sections 398 and 399 of the
Restatement and quoted section 398 and comment a to that sec-
tion.79 The opinion also stated that the Clapper Case and the Chat-
Janooga Case left open the question of the applicable law where
the state of injury is the state where the "major incidents of
the employment are located '8 0 and did not attempt to decide the
question except as required by the case before it.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the award was
again affirmed, Mr. Justice Stone delivering the opinion of the
court. The opinion considered at length the effect on the case
of the-due process and full faith and credit clauses of the federal
constitution.
With regard to the due process clause, the Court said:
" . . .where the contract is entered into within the state,
even though it is to be performed elsewhere, its terms, its obliga-
tion, and its sanctions are subject, in some measure, to the legis-
lative control of the state....
"Objections which are founded upon the Fourteenth Amendment
musf. . . be directed, not to the existence of the power to impose
liability for an injury outside state borders, but to the manner
of its exercise as being so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount
to a denial of due process."
The court concluded that the application of the California
Act to this case was not "unreasonable" in the constitutional
sense and that the provision of the Act against contract stipula-
tions exempting the employer from liability was valid, emphasizing
the seasonal nature of the employment rendering application for
compensation in Alaska improbable and also stressing the fact that
the employee was to return to California with the consequent
danger of becoming a public charge.8 ' A caveat was entered, how-
ever, to the effect that it was unnecessary to consider what the
effect would be of the parties being domiciled in Alaska or of
76(1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 716, discussed in (1935) 44
Yale L J, 869.79The citations were to Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Proposed
Final Draft No. 4 (1934), sections 434 and 436. Those sections are
identical with the present sections 398 and 399. The citation to comment
a was to Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Proposed Final Draft No. 3,
section 434, comment a, which is practically identical with the present
comment a, quoted supra, p. 32, to section 398.
BOThis phrase apparently 'as adapted from a similar phrase used in a
note in (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 291, 298. This note was cited in the
same paragraph of the opinion.
6 Compire the similar emphasis on the danger of pauperism in the
state in some of the recent Wisconsin cases, discussed supra, p. 30.
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their relationship to California being such as to give it a "lesser
interest in protecting the employee."
In considering the effect of the full faith and credit require-
ment, the court assumed that it is made applicable to territorial
statutes by the federal statutes. The court's approach to the
problem is indicated by the following excerpt from the opinion:
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own
state its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that
right, because of the force given by the full faith and credit clause,
assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of
the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum. It follows that not every statute
of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause; that the statute of a
state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of another,
both at home and abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting
statutes may each prevail over the other at home, although given
no extraterritorial effect in the state of the other."
The court concluded that the interest of Alaska was not
shown to be superior to that of California. After pointing out the
differences between this case and the Clapper Case, the court
declined to inquire into the question whether the California Act
could be denied any effect in Alaska.
The Alaska Packers Case already has begun to exercise an in-
fluence. In a case in the court of appeals for the District of
Columbia 82 the contract was made in Alabama; the employment
was in that state, in other states, and finally in the District of
Columbia where the fatal injury occurred. The "elective" Ala-
bama Act expressly applied and provided for an exclusive remedy.
The District of Columbia Act also contained exclusive provisions.
"Applying the rule declared in the Alaska Packers Case," the
court held that the District of Columbia Act could be applied,
emphasizing the fact that the contract of employment contemplated
service in other states, that the employee was not a resident of
Alabama where his period of actual service was brief, that he
had worked for several months in the District, and that his wife
and children were not living in Alabama. The court argued that
the District had a legitimate public interest to impose liability and
provide a remedy; to require the employee to go to Alabama for
redress would involve time and expense and might cause the
employee to become a public charge.
82United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, (App. D.C. 1935) 77 F. (2d)
542, discussed in (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 146.
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These developments since the Clapper Case and particularly
since the publication of the Restatement show quite dearly that
the Restatement's treatment of the doctrine of the Clapper Case
is both too broad and too narrow in the respects discussed above,
i. e., in the recognition of the act of making the contract as alone
sufficient and in the limitation to the abolition of tort or wrong-
ful death remedies.
IV. EFFECT OF PREvious Awim.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that it is quite
possible for the Act of more than'one state to apply to an injury,
even under the recent United States Supreme Court cases. That
situation requires adjustment of awards under the Acts. The
Restatement says:
"Sec. 403. Effect of Previous Award.
"Award already had under the Workmen's Compensation Act
of another state will not bar a proceeding under an applicable Act,
but the amount paid on a prior award in another state will be
credited on the second award."
This is the only sensible way of handling the problem, and there
is considerable authority to support it."3 The best exposition of
the view is in Hughey v,. Ware,"' a 1929 New Mexico case. In
refusing to allow full compensation under the New Mexico Act
after the employee had procured an award and some payments
under the Texas Act, the court said:
"There was but one accident. It is the public policy of this
state that, for such accident, compensation shall be made in a
certain amount, to secure the injured employee against want, and
to avoid his becoming a public charge. The employer is required
to carry compensation insurance. This is a device to place upon
the industry as a whole the cost of the prescribed compensation.
In the case at-ar ... the industry has already borne the cost
imposed upon it by Texas law. That may be more or less than
under our law. But if both laws may be invoked, the charge im-
8SThe New York cases, which lend some support to this view but are
in some confusion, are discussed in 11 MnxmsoA LAw Rsvsw 329, 346.
Other cases supporting this view are: McLaughlin's Case (1931) 274
Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Migue's Case, (1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183
N. E. 847; see Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1931) 203
Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889; McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co., v. Industrial
Commission, (1933) 212 Wis. 507, 250 N. W. 396.
Compare somewhat analogous situations in Sweet v. Austin Co., (1934)
12 N. J. Misc. 381, 171 Atl. 684; Shout v. Gunite Concrete and Construc-
tion Co., (1931) 226 Mo. App. 388, 41 S. W. (2d) 629; American Mut.
Liability Co. v. McCaffrey, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 870, cert.
denied (1930) 281 U. S. 751, 50 S. Ct. 354, 74 L. Ed. 1162.
s4(1929) 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27.
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posed upon the industry by the public policy of either state will
be exceeded ...
"We need not decide whether appellant [the employee], by
invoking Texas law, irrevocably renounced all rights under New
Mexico law. We cannot doubt that what he has received under
the Texas award is chargeable to him, and to be credited to the
industry upon which the expense ultimately falls, as though
voluntarily paid and accepted."
The court referred to a dictum in an early New Jersey case85
that "recovery of compensation in two states is no more illegal,
and is not necessarily more unjust than recovery upon two policies
of accident or life insurance." • The New Mexico court answered
thus :
"This analogy is false. Public policy has not as yet concerned
itself with the amount of accident insurance one may carry at
his own expense. It is- concerned with the amount of compensa-
tion, because the cost, originally chargeable to his employer, is
passed on, in theory at least, to society, by the addition it makes
to the cost of producing what the public consumes."
This argument would seem to apply even where the compen-
sation payments are to the state in the absence of dependents
of the employee,8 6 although the factor of double recovery by the
same person is not present.
Other views have been taken. It has been held in Tennessee
that the institution of proceedings in Ohio constituted a renuncia-
tion of the "contract" which included the Tennessee "elective"
Act and an "election" which became irrevocable when the benefit
of the Ohio proceedings was tdken by receiving payments.8 7  The
ssRounsaville v. Central R. R. Co., (1915) 87 N. J. L 371, 374, 94
Atl. 392. For the subsequent disposition of this case, see (1917) 90 N. J. L.
176, 101 Ati. 182.8 1n Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1931) 203 Wis.
466, 234 N. W. 889, cited supra, ,n. 83, the partially dependent parents of
the employee who had been killed recovered compensation in Iowa; in this
proceeding in Wisconsin an award was made requiring a payment to the
Wisconsin state treasurer under a provision of the Wisconsin Act relating
to the situation where no person is wholly dependent on the decedent. In
discussing the matter of double compensation, the court made no point of
the fact that the state was recovering.
That a similar situation might arise in other states is suggested by the
following cases: Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, (1932)
143 Misc. 589, 258 N. Y. S. 35; Industrial Commissioner v. Underwood,
Elliott Fisher Co., (App. Div. 1935) 282 N. Y. S. ,229; Employers' Lia-
bility Assur. Corporation v. Eaby, (1934) 111 Pa. Super. 589, 170 At. 352.
67Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (1931) 163 Tenn. 420,
648, 43 S. W. (2d) 221, 45 S. W. (2d) 528, cited supra, n. 68.
This election notion finds some support elsewhere. See Associated
Indemnity Corporation v. Landers, (1932) 159 Okla. 190, 14 P. (2d) 950
(no election because employee had no knowledge that he was receiving
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idea of "estoppel"851 and other ideas 9 have been used to prevent
recovery. On the other hand, a Texas court saw no objection to
recovery under the Texas Act in spite of collection under the
New Mexico Act, emphasizing the fact that neither Act gave
full compensation and stating that it was no concern of the de-
fendant insurance company that the employee had received com-
pensatioh under the New Mexico insurance policy.00 However,
the Texas Act was amended in 1927 to prevent recovery where
the employee has "elected" to recover and has recovered in the
state of injury.9 ' Statutes deal with this matter in some other
states.92
In passing, it is interesting to notice the insurance problems that
sometimes arise when different companies insure against liability
under different Acts.9 3 For example, in a Connecticut case0 ' the
employer paid compensation under the Connecticut Act for an
injury in Vermont. The employer had taken out policies in
Connecticut and Vermont and naturally supposed that he was pro-
tected under any contingency. He sued both companies but was
denied recovery against either on the ground that the Vermont
policy covered only liabilities' under the Vermont Act and that
compensation under Kansas Act; he deposited a check for the anount
received with the Oklahoma commission).
ssDe Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., (Vt. 1934) 173 At. 556.89See Finkley v. Eugene Saenger Tailoring Shop, (Ind. App. 1935) 196
N. E. 536, cited supra, n. 35 (award elsewhere regarded as one factor in
denying applicability of Indiana Act) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Pitts, (1932)
158 Okla. 200, 13 P. (2d) 180 (injury connected with original accident in
Texas in which proceedings had been instituted; adjustment by Texas
authorities would eliminate question of double recovery).
9OTexas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 300
S. kV. 667, writ of error dismissed, no opinion being expressed on question
of "election" because no assignment on that point, (1927) 117 Tex. 173.
300 S. W. 672; criticized in (1928) 6 Tex. L. Rev. 404, quoting 1927
amendment. Compare Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 68, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d)
473, quoting 1927 amendment.
91Texas, Laws 1927, ch. 259, sec. 1; quoted elsewhere as indicated in n.
90, supra.2See Georgia Code, 1933, sec. 114-411; Maryland Laws 1933, ch. 354;
North Carolina Code, 1931, sec. 8081 (rr); Virginia Code, 1933, sec. 1887
(37) (b).
93Illustrative cases are: Cole v. Industrial Commission, (1933) 353 II.
415, 187 N. E. 520, 90 A. L. R. 116, cited supra, n. 71; Norwich Union
Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 68, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 473. Compare Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. &
Eng. Corp. v. Industrial Comm., (1934) 355 Ill. 519, 189 N. E. 916.
94Miller Bros. Const. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., (1931) 113 Conn.
504, 155 _Atl. 709. For a subsequent attempt in Vermont to recover from
the insurer under the Vermont policy, see DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const.
Co. (Vt. 1934) 173 Ati. 556.
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the Connecticut policy did not cover the injury in Vermont I The
court expressed regret that the Connecticut act permitted such a
situation as to insurance.
V. REMEDIES AGAINST THIRD PERSONS-OTHER MATTERS
NOT EXPRESSLY COVERED IN THE RESTATEMENT.
Section 401, quoted above,95 does mention the remedies against
third persons but does not enter into the problem as it usually
arises in the cases, viz.,, the effect of "subrogation" or "assign-
ment" provisions in the Acts in favor of an employer or insurer
who has paid compensation. The earlier cases were stated in
the previous article;96 some of the recent cases will be stated
here. It is difficult if not impossible to formulate many useful
generalizations as yet. This much is clear: the interpretation of
an assignment provision is governed by the decisions of the state
the Act of which is involved. 7
In a Virginia case 8 the plaintiff brought an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained in an accident in Virginia. The
defendant set up as a defense the fact that the plaintiff had been
awarded compensation under the Pennsylvania Act. The plain-
tiff was an employee of a resident of Pennsylvania, and the con-
tract of employment was made there. The Pennsylvania Act per-
mitted an employee to receive compensation and also to sue for
damages against a third party, but the employer was subrogated
to any recovery from the third person to the extent of compensa-
tion payments made. Under the Virginia Act, as it was at the
time of the injury, acceptance of an award under that Act by
an employee constituted an election which barred him from pro-
ceeding against a third person; the employer could sue but could
recover only the amount of compensation paid, and the employee
could not participate in the recovery. This provision of the Vir-
ginia Act was held to be no bar to the action. The court argued
that the employment was within the Pennsylvania Act and out-
95p. 33.
95611 M INEsOTA LAW REvIEw 329, 349-352.
-
9 7Scott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1933) 333 Mo. 374, 62 S. W. (2d)
834; cf. Ierardi v. Farmers Trust Co., (Superior Ct. 1928) 34 Del. 246,
151 Atl. 822; Henriksen v. Crandic Stages, (1933) 216 Iowa 643, 246
N. W. 913.9 8Solomon v. Call, (1932) 159 Va. 625, 166 S. E. 467. The Court
cited Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Company, (1924) 132 Wash. 108, 231
Pac. 773, 37 A. L. R. 830 and Rorvik v. Northern Pac. Lumber Co., (1921)
99 Or. 58, 190 Pac. 331, 195 Pac. 163; both of those cases were discussed
in 11 MINNEsOTA LAW REVIEW 329, 350-351.
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side the Virginia Act and rejected the argument that to uphold
the Pennsylvania Act would be to disregard the public policy
expressed by the Virginia Act.29
A number of the recent cases have involved in various ways
the effect of assignment or subrogation provisions in the Act of
one state upon an action under the wrongful death statute of an-
other state.
Thus in a case"00 in the circuit court of appeals, fourth circuit,
the employee was fatally injured in Virginia, and an action was
brought in North Carolina by the employee's administrator against
the third person. While the action was pending, the employee's
widow was awarded compensation under the Act of North Caro-
lina, the state, of the employee's residence and the employer's
incorporation. The insurer then filed in the wrongful death
action a notice of the award, of its subrogation to the right of
action, and of its election to sue in the name of the administrator.
The defendant set up the acceptance of the award by the widow as
a defense on the ground that the widow was the sole beneficiary
under the Virginia wrongful death statute. This was held to be
no defense, and a judgment dismissing the action was reversed.
The court argued that, in the absence of any provision to the
contrary in Virginia, the assignment was governed by the North
Carolina Act. The widow, by accepting the compensation im-
pliedly agreed to the assignment which the North Carolina Act
directed and was estopped from disputing the rights of the per-
son claiming under the assignment. The assignment was of no
concern to the defendant. The court further argued cogently that
under the North Carolina and Virginia statutes if the death oc-
99A similar willingness to give effect to the assignment provisions of
another state's Act is shown by the court in Kandelin v. Lee Moor Con-
tracting Co., (1933) 37 N. M6f. 479, 24 P. (2d) 731 (injury in New Mexico;
injured employee sued third person for damages; court recognized right of
employer's insurer to participate in recovery, to xtent of compensation
payments made under California Act, if established by pleading and proof
that California Act provided for partial assignment). But cbrnpare Henrik-
sen v. Crandic Stages, (1933) 216 Iowa 643, 246 N. IV. 913.
On the other hand, a provision of the New York Act giving the insurer
who makes payments to the state treasurer under certain circumstances a
cause of action against the third party was held not to apply to an injuryT
which occurred in New Jersey, on the ground that the liability of the tort,
feasor must be governed by New Jersey law. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Central
R. Co. of New Jersey, (1932) 143 Misc. Rep. 589, 258 N. Y. S. 35. Cf. Em-
ployers' Liability Assur. Corporation v. Eaby, (1934) 111 Pa. Super. 589,
170 At. 352, involving the same provision of the New York Act.
'
0 Betts v. Southern Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787,
discussed in (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 26Y; (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1549.
One judge dissented in a brief opinion.
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curred in the state of employment, the insurer could recover from
the third party, and the result should not be different where the
death occurs in one state and the employment is in the other. The
court also took the position that whether the insurer could proceed
in this action or must institute a new action was a question of
procedure and governed by the law of the forum.
A like view was taken by the New Hampshire court'0 1 in a
situation quite similar except that the action was brought in the
state of the fatal injury, New Hampshire. Both cases contain
dicta that if the beneficiary under the death statute is a different
person from the one entitled to compensation under the com-
pensation Act, the right of the beneficiary could not be affected by
compensation paid someone else under the Act of another state.10 2
A similar problem arose in a different way in a New York
case. 103 In an accounting proceeding by a widow as administra-
trix of her husband's estate, it appeared that the husband had been
an employee of a New York corporation. He was killed in a
railway accident in Michigan. The widow received a compensa-
tion award under the New York Act. Later she started an action
in Michigan against the railway company and received on a settle-
ment as ancillary administrator in Michigan over $7,000 which
she turned over to herself as administrator ini New York. The
insurer who paid the compensation award claimed part of that
sum under a section of the New York Act which provided for
an assigniment to the insurer of the cause of action for damages.
It was held that the insurer should be paid, on the ground that
the section of the New York Act applied to any action brought in
New York or any other state, and that the money was within
the jurisdiction to be distributed by the widow as administratrix
appointed by this court. However, the amount to be paid was
only the widow's share, one-third as fixed by the New York
statutes, rather than one-half as fixed by the Michigan statutes.
Another situation in which the compensation Acts and wrong-
ful death statutes of different states are involved is presented in
a Maryland case.' The employment contract was made and the
t s0lSaloshin v. Houle, (1931) 85 N. H. 126, 155 Atl. 47.
10 2Cf. Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1922) 176 Wis. 521, 532,
181 N. W. 852, 187 N. W. 746, discussed in 11 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
329, 351-352.
1031n re Hertell's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1929) 135 Misc. Rep. 36, 237
N. Y. S. 655, discussed in (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 971.
'
04London Guarantee & A~cident Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co., (1931)
161 Md. 145, 155 Ati. 334.
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fatal injury occurred in Texas. Compensation was awarded under
the Texas Act and paid by the insurer. The insurer then sued
the third person in Maryland, basing the action upon the Texas
wrongful death statute and the subrogation provisions of the Texas
Act. Recovery was denied because of the Maryland rule 05 that
an action under a foreign wrongful death statute cannot be main-
tained-unless there are substantially similar statutes in Maryland.
The court compared the wrongful death statutes and the sub-
rogation provisions of the Acts of both states and concluded
that they were not sufficiently similar.
A few recent workmen's compensation cases involving miscel-
laneous conflict of laws points remain to be considered. A time
limitation in an Act upon the recovery of compensation has been
respected in another jurisdiction.100 An exemption by the Act
of a compensation claim due under the Act from attachment has
been held to apply to the claim of a nonresident. 07 In a Georgia
case,'0 8 it was contended that the death of the employees was
not compensable under the Georgia Act because the death resulted
from their own wilful misconduct in violating the speed laws of
South Carolina, but the court followed the finding of the com--
mission that there had been no such violation.
CONCLUSION
The above criticism of certain sections of the Restatement is
not intended to be captious. It is no fair criticism that the
American LawInstitute has chosen one of several conflicting
rules; that is its privilege and, indeed, one of its functions. It
it a fair criticism, however, to insist that sufficient attention was
not given, with regard to the problem of when the local Act
applies, to cases" decided after the publication of the first drafts.
There is not enough difference, on this problem, between the
tentative draft. 9 published in April, 1928, and the final publication
in 1934. After all, workmen's compensation is of relatively
lOSThat rule is not followed in most jurisdictions. 2 Beale, The
Conflict of Laws, (1935) sec. 3922, citing this Maryland case on p. 1309,
n. 2; Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, (1935)
33 Mich. L. Rev. 545, citing this Maryland case on p. 561, n. 64. The
Restatement rejects the Maryland rule. Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
sec. 392, comment a.
10 6Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 64 F.
(2d) 800, cited supra, n. 10 and 70. See 3 Beale, The Conflict of Laws,
sec. 605.1, citing instant case at p. 1627, n. 7; Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, sec. 605.
107Festervand v. Laster, (1930) 15 La. App. 159, 130 So. 634.
lOSMetropolitata Casualty Ins. Co. v. Huhn, (1928) 165 Ga. 667, 142
S. E. 121.
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recent origin; the first American case involving a claim for
compensation for an injury occurring outside the state was de-
cided in Massachusetts in 1913.10 This lag'1 ' may be due, in
part, to the rather cumbersome machinery of the Institute.
The criticism of the Restatement's treatment of the Clapper
Case does not imply, of course, that account should have been
taken of cases decided after the publication of the Restatement.
Those cases merely demonstrate that the Restatements are not a
bar to progress. No true friend of the Institute desires that they
should be. On the other hand, the Restatement's conception of
the Clapper Case itself is open to fair comment, including atten-
tion to the influence of the case in other cases before the publica-
tion of the Restatement.
For the future, the Restatement, no doubt, will exercise some
influence, as it has done already,12 2 particularly as to the less con-
troversial matters. As to other matters, however, it is not likely
that different positions taken in many states will be abandoned or
that their influence in other states will cease. The tendency -to
enact express provisions in the Acts may continue. These pro-
visions have the merit of introducing a degree of certainty with
the corresponding disadvantage of limiting the flexibility which
may be desirable in the unusual case. General uniformity seems
a long way off, although considerable copying, especially in the
same section of the country, 13 will take place as in the past. It
is significant that the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1928 withdrew as obsolete the Uniform Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act."'1 Complete abdication seems unnecessary. The com-
missioners might well consider the preparation of short statutes
dealing with particular problems, e. g., the effect of a previous
award in another state." 5 Finally, the existing and possible future
cases in the United States Supreme Court will limit local vagaries,
but probably will leave considerable room for the play of local
policy.
losConflict of Laws, Restatement No. 4 (1928), Topic V, citing the
author's previous article in 11 MINNESoTA LAW RFEviw 329.
11°Gould's Case, (1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D
372, 4 N. C. C. A. 60, cited supra, n. 17.
l"lCompare a similar lag in the Torts Restatement, discussed in Feezer,
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, (1935) 19 MINNEsoTA LAW REvww 752,
761-762.
"12See supra, n. 55 and 79. 2'8See supra, n. 92.
114(1928) Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, p. 30-31.
11Other methods of reform are suggested in 11 MINNEsOTA LAW
RE~vw 329, 352-353.
